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Abstract 
In the frame of the Stairway to Excellence project, complex country analysis was performed for the EU MS that joined the 
EU since 2004, with the objective to assess and corroborate all the qualitative and quantitative data in drawing 
national/regional FP7 participation patterns, understand the push–pull factors for FP7/H2020 participation and the factors 
affecting the capacity to absorb cohesion policy funds. This report articulates analysis on selected aspects and country-
tailored policy suggestions aiming to tackle the weaknesses identified in the analysis. 
The report complements the complex qualitative/ quantitative analysis performed by the IPTS/KfG/S2E team. In order to 
avoid duplication and cover all the elements required for a sound analysis, the report builds on analytical framework 
developed by IPTS. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Latvia has a solid track record regarding its participation in the European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF, called Structural Funds [SF] in the previous programming period) and relatively little success regarding 
its participation in Framework Programmes (hereinafter - FP)/Horizon 2020 programmes. A research made by 
an independent entity in Central and Eastern Europe, a limited liability company within the KPMG1 
International network, shows that the payment ratio (EU structural fund grants paid to the total fund budget 
available) of Latvia in the programming period 2007-2013 was above the average one for Central and 
Eastern European countries (70 percent in Latvia’s case and 63 percent on average).2 On the other hand, the 
sixth FP7 monitoring report indicates that during 2007-2012 Latvia was the country with the second lowest 
number of EU financial contribution per applicant in retained proposals for FP7 calls.3 In 2008-2009, Latvia 
experienced a severe financial crisis which was followed by budget cuts to public research organisations 
(PROs). During the crisis, SFs (now ESIFs) were distributed based mainly on need rather than on a competitive 
basis. Despite the fact that taking such an approach was rational and beneficial at the time, it effectively 
created a system whereby Public Research Organisations (PROs) and Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) 
became heavily reliant on continued funding from SF/ESIF. Moreover, it is notable that in the period of 2007-
2013 a large part of the funds in Latvia went to reinforce market successes rather than to address market 
failures.4 The main actors in the R&D Structural Funds governance system in the programming period 2007-
2013 were the Research and Innovation Council (RIC), the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES), the State 
Education Development Agency (VIAA), the Ministry of Economics (MoE), the Investment and Development 
Agency of Latvia (LIAA) and the Central Finance and Contracting Agency (CFLA). Recently, Latvia introduced 
some changes in the ESIF governance system for programming period 2014-2020 – concentrating the 
administration of the funds in the hands of one coordinating authority, namely the CFLA, with the aim of 
decreasing costs and increasing efficiency. 
For the purpose of this report 25 interviews were held with representatives of parties related to EU fund 
governance either from the policy-making, research or business perspectives. Among the people interviewed 
there were representatives of the business community, researchers from PROs and HEIs, policy-makers from 
the ministries central to research and innovation as well as funding allocation. The interviewee list also 
includes public officers from governmental funding agencies and the National Contact Point (NCP), 
representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Chamber of Commerce and others. Part of the interviewees 
were first sent questionnaires developed in cooperation with the Joint Research Centre - Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS) and then expressed their opinions during face-to-face semi-
structured interviews while several other interviews were held over the phone. 
Several of the system’s strengths were identified by the interviewees: 
 The project selection process and determination of eligibility criteria are perceived as being transparent 
and free of corruption; 
 The high involvement of all stakeholders, including the government, society, the business community and 
the education and science sectors in the policy development process – for instance, according to the 
interviewees, Latvia effectively used the requirement to develop RIS3 and build an effective platform 
wherein stakeholders could communicate and involve R&D developers in policy building; 
                                                        
1 http://www.kpmg.com/cee/en/pages/default.aspx   
2 KPMG in Central and Eastern Europe (2014). EU Funds in Central and Eastern Europe. Progress Report 2007-2013. 
Retrieved from: https://www.kpmg.com/SI/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/EU-Funds-in-Central-and-
Eastern-Europe.pdf  
3 European Commission (2013). Sixth FP7 Monitoring Report. Retrieved from:  
http://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp7_monitoring_reports/6th_fp7_monitoring_report.pdf  
4 Market success here refers to relatively safe hard investments for capital replacement or extension which have proven 
to pay off in the past. Market failures are defined as hard or soft investments of more challenging and risky nature that 
could be value adding but have not been sufficiently developed. For a more detailed explanation see section 0.  
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 The development of a Smart Specialisation Strategy contributed to a more inclusive and transparent 
policy building process. 
 
The main weaknesses were identified as: 
 The lack of trust between R&D developers and policy-makers, as well as among policy-makers;  
 The small research base – less than 6000 R&D jobs, including PROs, HEIs, business organisations and 
government placements. Negative demographic tendencies and ageing of current researchers might 
contribute to the further shrinking of it; 
 The skill gap is considered to be one of the biggest development challenges by the business community 
and backed by discussions in reports by the Ministry of Economics; 
 The excessive bureaucracy and documentation in selection of projects, administration and control 
processes; 
 The heavy reliance on the accessibility of ESIF/SF due to extensive use of needs-based (as opposed to 
competition-based) fund distribution approach 
 The basis of project selection and evaluation procedures solely on quantitative and qualitative criteria 
instead of a combination of selection criteria and an  assessment/peer review by an expert; 
 The inappropriate evaluation and control mechanisms applied to projects related to innovation support – 
using the same approach for both innovation related projects and infrastructure projects; 
 Inefficient procurement law – too strict of an interpretation of procurement law by the Public 
Procurement Bureau. 
 The tendency to allocate more funding to “hard investments”, such as investments in infrastructure, that 
are already familiar and have a low risk profile rather than “soft investments” like human resources. 
Such tendencies are also observed in the context of the public research infrastructure - infrastructure 
investments amount to €181m, which constitutes 72% of total investment in R&D (Table 2). Even the 
Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, in its answers to the Parliament on January 
2014,5 acknowledged that innovation capacity includes both capacity of the human resources and 
international competitiveness and research infrastructure. 
 
One of the biggest challenges for Latvia will be the consolidation of its research system - decreasing the 
number of institutions by more than half (from 44 to 20) over the next four years. As mentioned in the 
interviews by a policy-maker from the Ministry of Education and Science and successful R&D performers, it 
would be politically challenging and competitive, and ESI funds could be used as one of the tools facilitating 
this process.  
As also mentioned by the interviewees, another important challenge for Latvia will be to implement the 
changes that have already been planned. This challenge would be in place due to a very cautious, 
conservative thinking and risk averse contingent within the policy-makers and executive bodies. The challenge 
is further amplified by a very low margin for error allowed by the audit-led evaluation approaches that limit 
the ability to implement change. 
Some of the above-mentioned policy changes that have already been implemented or predicted for the 
period 2014-2020 are related to the Smart Specialisation Strategy and are as follows: 
With regard to transparent and comprehensive policy building process; 
 Focus on peer-review and international expertise in evaluation and monitoring of the projects; 
 More focus on building human capacity in the area of research and innovation; 
                                                        
5 The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, "Answers to the questions to parliament", Letter 
(Latvijas Republikas Saeimas Kancelejai, 2014, gada 29. janvārī 
http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS11/saeimalivs_lmp.nsf/0/d75e578f43c07ab9c2257c6f00512fb6/$FILE/1_21-11_14.pdf  
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 Focus on consolidation of fragmented higher education and research systems; 
 A new approach to policy design - fewer objectives and goals, more focus on innovation and closer 
to market approach; 
 More focus on building of excellence in science; 
 Entrepreneurial discovery as part of the policy cycle; 
 
Synergies between SF and FP are very few and limited. A separate work submitted with this report is a case 
study6 which describes the synergies of using SF and FP funds by the Latvian Institute of Organic Synthesis. 
The synergies taken place in Latvia are not seen ex-ante; they are more coincidental coming from the nature 
of the programmes. In the interviews, the stakeholders very highly rated the FP/H2020 projects in terms of 
their impact on development of R&D capacity and expertise. Thus, the rationale for participation is 
acknowledged by the R&D performers. To successfully apply for such programmes, Latvian researchers, 
engineers and organisations have to consistently increase their international exposure and establish a better 
network. They also should have a solid track record of performance in order to have a chance at being invited 
to join an international consortium. As the most important factors that matter for being invited to such 
consortium, the interviewees mentioned networking with international peers and reputation. SF/ESIF can, in 
this context, be viewed as a valuable tool having the potential to facilitate admission to the Framework 
Programmes. On the other hand, the benefits gained through participation in FP/H2020 programmes might 
motivate the researchers/institutions to use other funds (including SF/ESIF) more efficiently. 
The main policy suggestions proposed by this paper include: 
 
 Focusing on human capital building in R&D as the primary goal of development; 
 Focusing more on the number of R&D jobs rather than on R&D spending in monetary terms; 
 Simplification of the ESIF programmes, bringing their project selection, controlling and 
administration systems closer to those of H2020/FP;  
 Taking the principles of entrepreneurial discovery into account when building policies related to 
research, development and, especially, innovation (R&D&I); this would imply that, among other 
things, the policies should take into account the existence of different reasons of the project failures 
and respond to them respectively. The projects, which did not reach the initial objectives due to 
different reasons than fund mismanagement but eventually contributed to stock of knowledge, 
should not face financial contraction by default. On the other side, if the reason behind the project 
failure is mismanagement of the funds, such enforcement would be applied.  
 Focusing more on soft investment in business support or more ambitious “hard investment” – high 
tech, more risky projects, like first scale production or advanced manufacturing capabilities (for more 
detailed discussion see section 2.1.1); 
 Conditions and restrictions imposed by the European Commission that would enable undertaking 
new, less familiar policy building approaches. One of the key provisions required, as observed during 
the interviews by the author of the report, is adjusting the consequences imposed by the European 
Commission regarding SF projects of first scale and advanced manufacturing capabilities that often 
do not reach intended goals. Such strict consequences will shape future policy choices more than 
any policy suggestion or evaluation document. 
 Changing procurement law to include simpler and more effective public procurement principles; 
 Giving priority to ESIF to finance the projects that have applied on H2020 programme, passed the 
thresholds but did not receive the H2020 fund (as one of the ways to facilitate participation in 
H2020 programmes); 
 Regarding RIS3 – allowing for complementary specialisation areas rather than just unique 
competences 
 
                                                        
6 The case study is available at http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/cases-studies  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Background of Stairway to excellence project  
The European Commission Framework Programme (FP) for Research and technology development has been 
vital in the development of European knowledge generation. However, there is considerable disparity across 
EU countries and regions in terms of FP participation and innovation performance. 
Horizon 2020 will continue to provide funding on the basis of excellence, regardless of geographical location. 
However, it will also introduce novel measures for "spreading excellence and widening participation" by 
targeting low Research & Innovation (R&I) performing countries - most of whom are eligible for innovation 
funding under Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020. 
In addition, the new regulations for ESIF aim to use funds more effectively to build regional/national 
excellence and capacities. By doing so, the key funding sources (ESIF and Horizon 2020) can complement one 
another along the entire innovation process. 
Objective of S2E 
The Stairway to Excellence (S2E) project is centred on the provision of support to enhance the value of the 
key European Union (EU) funding sources for research, development and innovation: European Structural and 
Investment Funds and Horizon 2020 but also the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (COSME), Erasmus+, Creative Europe, European Union Programme for Employment and 
Social Innovation ("EaSI") and the digital services part of the Connecting Europe Facility by actively promoting 
their combination.  The project has two main objectives, namely: 
 Providing of assistance to regions and countries that  joined the EU since 2004 in closing the 
innovation gap, in order to promote excellence in all regions and EU countries; 
 Stimulating the early and effective implementation of national and regional Smart Specialisation 
Strategies. 
 
Main purpose of the document  
In the frame of the project, complex country analysis is performed for all 13 EU MS with the objective to 
assess and corroborate all the qualitative and quantitative data in drawing national/regional FP7 participation 
patterns, understand the push–pull factors for FP7 participation and the factors affecting the capacity to 
absorb cohesion policy funds. This report articulates analysis on selected aspects and country-tailored policy 
suggestions aiming to tackle the weaknesses identified in the analysis.  
The report complements the complex qualitative/ quantitative analysis performed the IPTS/KfG/S2E team. In 
order to avoid duplication and cover all the elements required for a sound analysis, the report builds on 
analytical framework developed by IPTS. 
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2. QUALITY OF THE GOVERNANCE 
In Latvia, two ministries are in charge of designing the policies applied to research, development and 
innovation (hereinafter referred to as R&D, R&I or R&D&I); namely, the Ministry of Education and Science and 
the Ministry of Economics. The Ministry of Education and Science is mainly responsible for research and 
development and it has the leading role in designing RIS3 (Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart 
Specialisation) for Latvia, whereas innovation support is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economics. 
Considering the insights provided by the interviews that were conducted for the preparation of this report, the 
administration and implementation of policies in Latvia is generally considered as relatively effective with 
few issues in place (discussed in latter sections). Governmental agencies (e.g. the State Education 
Development Agency [The Latvian abbreviation used throughout the report – VIAA]) and policy-makers find 
that coordination is improving. 
Based on the results of the interviews, development of R&I governance in Latvia is very rapid. During the 
preparation of this report, over the course of four months, significant changes in governance and strategies 
have been observed. Some of the issues related to governance of Structural Funds (SF) and European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) was emphasised by the interviewees. It has already been addressed 
by the new policies by the time that this report had been finalised. For instance, the extensive number of 
selection criteria that excessively constrained R&I performers in their projects, as discussed in section 2.1, 
have already been taken into account in the new programme proposals brought forward by the Ministry of 
Education and Science. Given the rapid and significant adjustments being made with regard to the European 
Union’s (EU) fund management on the policy making level, this report should be considered as a snapshot of 
the situation at the time of submission. 
General strategies and objectives of the EU funding programmes for the 2014-2020 period are set out in the 
“European Commission–Latvia Partnership Agreement for 2014-2020”7 and the main management principles 
are regulated by the “Law on Management of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds 2014 – 2020 Programming 
Period”8.  When it comes to promoting innovation, the national strategy is presented in the “Guidelines for 
National Industrial Policy for 2014-2020”9, as well as in the “Guidelines for Science, Technology 
Development, and Innovation 2014-2020”10  (the latter will be referred to as TDIG). The guidelines include 
the areas and goals of priorities to Latvia, guidance for their implementation and policy objectives. TDIG was 
developed on the basis of the Smart Specialisation Strategy for Latvia and the “Guidelines for National 
Industrial Policy”. The conceptual model of the national innovation system is provided in Figure 1, whereas for 
a more detailed overview of the legal framework for EU fund governance see Appendix A. 
The conceptual model (Figure 1) is presented in the “Science, technology development and innovation (STDI) 
guidelines for 2014-2020” to illustrate a new horizontal approach to science and innovation policy. According 
to the guidelines, the purpose of this structure is to bring the research and industry sectors closer, link them 
in a single system with compatible approaches to their policy issues and suggested solutions. STDI, under the 
horizontal policy, affects issues of economy and industry development as well as sectoral issues by 
developing science, technology and innovation, and are connected by organisations involved in transfer of 
knowledge and research, state institutions of political and administration levels, enterprises and 
infrastructure support tools. The guidelines emphasize that the positive impact of research and innovations 
depends not only on the actions of the involved institutions but also on their cooperation and their power to 
influence the legislative environment, social institutes’ norms. The task of the state policy in this context is to 
                                                        
7 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/pa/partnership-agreement-latvia-summary_en.pdf; 
8 For more information, see (in Latvian) http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=267471; accessed on 22/07/2015; 
9 Latvian version available at http://polsis.mk.gov.lv/view.do?id=4391;  
English version available at https://www.em.gov.lv/files/nozares_politika/finl_en%20(1).pdf 
10 Available at https://www.em.gov.lv/files/nozares_politika/2014ino.pdf  
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analyse potential obstacles in the operation of all system components and react accordingly by offering 
solutions. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of national Science Technology Development and Innovation model11 
 
The main actors in governance of research and development funds during 2007-2013 were: 
 The Research and Innovation Council (RIC) 
 The Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) 
 The State Education Development Agency (VIAA) 
 The Ministry of Economics (MoE) 
 The Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (LIAA) 
 The Central Finance and Contracting Agency (CFLA) 
 
                                                        
11 Source; Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, "Guidelines for Science, Technology Development, and Innovation 
2014-2020" (Riga, 2013. gada 18. jūnijā), https://www.em.gov.lv/files/nozares_politika/2014ino.pdf. 
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chaired by the Prime Minister
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 Figure 2. Organogram - agents involved in the governance of R&D funds (including ESIF for RDI) 
and their roles (figure created by the author) 
The organogram (Figure 2) represents the functions of each body with respect to the EU Structural Funds 
programmes and policy design. The functions of the organisations in this context are presented next to the 
arrows on the right side of the figure. 
When developing the Smart Specialisation Strategy, a need for a new institutional body - the Research and 
Innovation Council - arose. This body had to be prominent in the decision-making hierarchy so that it would 
have the authority to interrogate research and innovation policies and monitor the Smart Specialisation 
Strategy.  
The Research and Innovation Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, advises the Cabinet of Ministers on 
important matters concerning the research and technology investments and evaluation of policy proposals. 
The Research and Innovation Council consists of Ministers, representatives of higher education institutions 
(HEIs), representatives of the regions, Chamber of Commerce, Confederation of Employers, Baltic Innovative 
Research and Technology Infrastructure (BIRTI - an NGO), the Academy of Science and the Cross-Sectoral 
Coordination Centre. 
The Research and Innovation Council was established at the end of 2013. Throughout 2014, the Innovation 
Council held meetings on a weekly basis, usually on the day preceding the meeting of the Cabinet of 
Ministers. The Council generated input on policy decisions and became a platform for stakeholders to try to 
reach consensus regarding potential decisions to be made by the Cabinet. The Council contributes to a more 
inclusive decision-making process. 
The Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) coordinates/governs the public research and education policies. 
It has the most important role in designing R&I policies, supporting project financing instruments and the 
Smart Specialisation Strategy. Specifically, two departments within MoES are in charge of the R&I policy 
planning and education: 
 Department of Higher Education, Science and Innovations - responsible for policy design and 
monitoring in the fields of higher education, science, research, and innovation12 
                                                        
12 http://www.izm.gov.lv/lv/ministrija/kontakti. Accessed 23.04.2015 
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 Department of Structural Funds – together with the State Education Development Agency (VIAA) - 
responsible for implementation of Structural Funds programmes13 
 
Programmes designed by MoES are executed by the State Education Development Agency (VIAA). According 
to latest changes in ESIF governance, most of the functions of VIAA will be moved to CFLA during 2014-2020 
period. 
In 2013, the Ministry underwent significant structural and staff changes. The changes were initiated by the 
Minister Mr. Roberts Ķīlis (2011-2013), who came to the position with the aim of reforming the education, 
science and research sectors. The Minister launched these reforms by replacing the holders of key posts with 
experts who had been mainly educated in Western European or American universities or who had long-term 
experience working in international institutions. In March 2013, a new State Secretary was assigned, who 
before had worked in the World Bank, along with other new staff in key management positions. Based on the 
opinions of the majority of the interviewees, the new management completely changed the policy planning, 
and that marks the moment when policy planning became more inclusive and transparent. However, even 
after more than two years of gradual change, the current structure of the Ministry is still not sufficiently 
developed to efficiently carry-out the tasks related to the R&I programme design, for instance, time-wise. 
According to one of the interviewees, a representative of the policy-maker perspective, there is a mismatch 
between the functions and tasks of a department and the available expertise. Constant overload, which 
started with the process of design of the Smart Specialisation Strategy in March 2013, does not allow 
enough attention to be paid to the organisational changes necessary to solve the capacity problem. One of 
the obstacles preventing this change is budget limitations and a lack of resources required to employ the 
necessary expertise. The second issue stems from a long history of a dominant top-down management 
approach in the Ministry with limited information being provided to the employees of lower levels and no 
efficient task delegation system in place. Due to this inveterate approach, it is difficult to transform the 
current system into one having more autonomous and independent employees. Moreover, the current 
structure of the Ministry allows for too many underpaid, lower-level positions. Some attempts to overcome 
the above-mentioned obstacles and improve the efficiency of human resource management within the 
Ministry can be observed – adequate reforms are planned for the summer of 2015. 
The State Education Development Agency (VIAA) is the largest agency under the Ministry of Education and 
Science. In the period 2007-2013, VIAA was the main coordinating institution of EU fund governance. VIAA 
mainly implements SF programmes related to education, science, research and some of the programmes 
targeting innovation. According to the information provided by the agency, by the end of the year 2014, VIAA 
had 173 employees.  
The interviews conducted for the purposes of this report indicate that MoES is assigning VIAA with an 
increasing number of duties. Reflecting on the interviews held with MoES itself, such a tendency could be 
explained by the fact that VIAA has proven to be more efficient than the Ministry at a variety of tasks. 
Overall, VIAA has developed a more “business-like” internal culture where achieving outcomes is prioritised 
over issues related to the process of implementation. Interviews revealed that employees of VIAA, including 
those that have already changed their work place, unanimously agree that VIAA is managed effectively and 
efficiently. 
In 2013, VIAA took over the National Contact Point (hereinafter referred to as NCP) with an aim to improve 
the efficiency of NCP’s operations. The National Contact Point is presented and discussed in more detail in 
section 5.1. Moreover, even though it was replaced by the CFLA when it comes to the governance of ESIF 
R&D funds, VIAA is still expected to play an important role in its respective policy planning and policy design 
in the period 2014-2020.  
                                                        
13 http://www.izm.gov.lv/lv/ministrija/kontakti. Accessed 23.04.2015 
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The Ministry of Economics (MoE) is responsible for the development of policies regarding business support 
and innovation. The departments of the Ministry of Economics, which are working connected with the EU 
Structural Funds, are designing, introducing and supervising SF programmes and projects related to 
enterprise support and innovation, whereas their implementation and administration is carried out by a direct 
subordinate of the Ministry - the Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (LIAA). 
According to the interviews, the Innovation Department under the Ministry of Economics has only three 
positions that are dedicated to innovation policy design. It is not capable of successfully carrying out all the 
tasks that are expected of it. For instance, the involvement of the Innovation Department of MoE in the 
development of RIS3 was limited in comparison to its role. Given that RIS3 has a strong potential for having 
an economic impact, it should fall under the field of MoE’s competence. However, as it has been observed in 
the case of Latvia so far, MoES (The Ministry of Education and Science) involvement in the development of 
RIS3 has surpassed that of MoE (The Ministry of Economics). Therefore, the leading role in the design of 
innovation policies moving forward will most likely still lie with the Ministry of Education and Science. 
The Latvian Investment and Development Agency (LIAA) has traditionally been responsible for business 
support and the execution of its respective SF programmes designed by the Ministry of Economics, since 
2004. However, unlike that of the VIAA and MoES, the relationship between the Ministry of Economics and 
LIAA has been rather complicated. The interviewees from the entrepreneurial side observed that the agency 
was strongly affected by its excessive focus on legal issues and documentation which has served as an 
obstacle to the efficient fulfilment of its duties regarding business support and innovation. In 2013 alone, 
there were six meetings of the Consultative Council dedicated solely to the improvement of performance of 
LIAA. Most of the discussions in these meetings revolved around the aim of decreasing excessive 
bureaucracy. In the period 2014-2020, the importance of LIAA in the context of EU funding will be reduced 
significantly as ESIF programme administration functions will be allocated to the Central Finance and 
Contracting Agency (hereinafter - CFLA). 
In 2013, the Ministry of Finance started a consultation process on the best solution to improve absorption of 
funding, minimisation of costs and bureaucracy. As a result, with regard to the governance of R&D funds for 
the period 2014-2020, VIAA and LIAA have been replaced by the Central Finance and Contracting Agency 
(CFLA). Arguments in support of this change included the decreased costs and reduced chances of 
mismanagement and errors occurring. Cost decrease is expected due to a reduced number of institutions (i.e. 
CFLA as the central body rather than multiple subordinate agencies of the Ministries) involved in the 
governance of EU funds. Fewer administrative expenses are expected as a result of having a single 
consistent approach for every programme, while reduced chances for mismanagement and error are likely to 
be achieved by assigning the programmes to a single organisation and following a single approach. 
Hence, during the 2014-2020 programming period, CFLA will be the only coordinating authority of ESIF. 
Given the increased importance of the organisation, CFLA has set out ambitious plans to increase its capacity 
(Table 1). 
The structure of the organisation is expected to change as well, for example, through the development of 
separate competences to serve business customers. Nevertheless, it is still too early to assess the real 
capabilities of the organisation in the years 2014-2020 as it will depend on some unknowns, such as specific 
focuses that will be chosen by the organisation and on the expertise the organisation will be able to attract 
for the period. 
During the interviews with various stakeholders, it was revealed that the new administrative body of EU 
funds is mostly viewed positively or, in some cases, neutrally.  
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Table 1. Planned capacity of CFLA (Source: The Ministry of Finance) 
  23.04.2013 Planned 2014-2020 
Project selection, control and management 109 350 
Payments, budget 10 17 
Legal support 5 8 
KP VIS system development and maintenance 7 10 
IKS IT systems development and maintenance 10 10  
Programme monitoring 11 8 
Consulting of customers and society 3 7 
General support 28 11 
Total number of employees 183 419 
 
The problems of governance of ESIF 
According to the interviews with various stakeholders as well as publicly available information, there are 
multiple issues related to ESIF fund governance that have a significant impact on the successful 
development of R&I in Latvia.  
Based on the insights provided by the interviewees, the SF governance seems relatively free of corruption 
due to its transparent evaluation and project selection procedures. However, transparency of the process is 
achieved by an excessive list of selection criteria, not by basing the selection on an objective expert 
evaluation. This issue is discussed in greater depth in section 9. 
Focus on speed of acquisition rather than on the impact  
According to some of the interviewees, even lately the Ministry of Economics sometimes attempts to make 
the ESIF distribution process faster, even though this is not always the best approach, and it should be kept in 
mind that quality is always a priority over speed.  
Lack of cooperative capabilities of the governing authorities 
During the interviews, several policy-makers also raised concerns about the quality of cooperation between 
the governing bodies. While some issues remain in this regard, it should be noted that the interviewees 
agreed that it is improving at the management level. The Ministry of Education and Science, for instance, was 
leading the RIS3 process and at the same time closely cooperating with the Ministry of Economics at the 
departmental level. 
Inefficient mechanisms meant for coping with potential mismanagement of funds  
Most of the programmes in Latvia are created with an assumption that there may be some entrepreneurs 
and even researchers that could attempt to exploit the programme. Thus, the programmes and control 
systems in place often incorporate certain details, criteria, excessive documentation and/or other 
requirements that would cause fraudulent applicants to incur significant costs that would make their 
exploitation of the system seem less attractive. However, such an approach results in increased costs for 
legitimate programme participants as well, as pointed out by the policy-makers during the interviews. 
Unrealistically high number and wide scope of project objectives 
Furthermore, the SF programmes designed by the Ministry of Education and Science as well as the Ministry 
of Economics frequently have an extensive list of objectives that need to be met in order to receive the 
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funding. As an example, the programme 1.1.1.2 “Attraction of human resources to science”14 was referred to 
during the interviews for having ten demanding qualitative criteria to fulfil. Such requirements drive 
applicants to write lengthy proposals which are rarely achievable. Very detailed objectives and requirements 
leave little room for input from the researchers, causing them to essentially design projects with very limited 
flexibility. Whilst it might appear that this approach is ensuring ambitious targets, it diminishes the roles of 
the project applicants by restricting their freedom to fully utilise their extensive knowledge to design projects 
in the fields in which they, unlike the policy-makers, are experts.  
Other issues that the current EU fund governance system experiences include the prevalence of policy-
makers’ risk aversion and conservatism, and a control system focusing on the process control rather than the 
results, both of which are presented in-depth in section 9. 
Soft versus hard investment 
Hereinafter, the term “hard investment” is used to describe investments in infrastructure, machinery, 
construction and other capital goods, whereas “soft investment” refers to investment in R&D&I activities, 
education, human resources, social investments and the like. During 2007-2013, a significant amount of 
business support went to “hard investment” as investments in production equipment, while soft investments 
were not very popular to provide business support in Latvia. As it can be seen in Appendix B, in all years, 
except for 2010, most of Latvian business support went to hard investment instead of supporting innovation 
activities. The investment was provided in the form of grants to companies.  
It should be noted that not all “hard investment” projects are equal. Typical hard investments during the 
period of 2007-2013 were simply targeting capital replacement and/or extension and the like. They usually 
had common features: already known products with few minor changes, an existing market ready for the 
product, high likelihood of success, reliable business plans based on prior experience and a mutual experts’ 
and policy makers’ agreement on high probability of success.  
However, another type of hard investments could be addressing first scale production, advanced 
manufacturing capabilities and the like. The common features of these types of projects are: limited 
understanding and knowledge on potential market reaction; potential of disruptiveness; dispersed opinions of 
experts and industry leaders on the probability of success, general understanding that it is a risky adventure. 
In the mentioned period, such projects accounted for a very insignificant proportion of total hard investment 
projects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these types of projects could have amounted to less than 5% 
from total hard investment projects. Attitude of funding agencies and policy makers to such kind of projects 
is generally negative. This is due to the several unsuccessful examples seen in the past, also including a 
recent case with possible negative consequences, which are not even fully known at the time of this report. 
At the same time, these types of projects have potentials to (and usually do) contribute to the stock of 
knowledge even if they do not reach all intended goals. 
In the context of this report, when analysing past experience of business support or when discussing 
amplification of market success, the term “hard investment” is used to refer to the first kind of such projects. 
Due to the strong influence of the business community on the decisions made by the Ministry of Economics, 
part of the funds went to reinforce market successes rather than to address market failures.15 One of the 
ways to define market failure is to refer to, for instance, a situation in which the company cannot obtain a 
sufficient return on its investment but at the same time this investment would have substantial positive 
externalities. Logically, it would be rational to subsidise the gap using public funding if the value of the 
                                                        
14 The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, “Noteikumi Par Darbības Programmas ‘Cilvēkresursi Un 
Nodarbinātība’ Papildinājuma 1.1.1.2.aktivitātes ‘Cilvēkresursu Piesaiste Zinātnei’ Otro Projektu Iesniegumu Atlases 
Kārtu,” LIKUMI.LV, accessed April 22, 2015, http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=252264. 
15 See Appendix D regarding the allocation of funds to soft (in this context comparable to, and can approximate, market 
failures) versus hard (market success) investments. 
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externalities exceeds the necessary subsidy. From the point of view of the companies, the situation is 
different. Solving market failures means that the company will receive funds to cover a negative return, i.e. 
the net gain from such a subsidy is small. Meanwhile, if the other option - enhancing market success or any 
regular activities - is subsidised, then the subsidy amplifies existing returns and the subsidy contributes to 
the company’s profits. In the case of Latvia, parallels could be drawn with soft and hard investments, where 
soft investments were perceived as market failures and hard investments were viewed as regular market 
activities that could yield returns, and both had opportunities to be subsidised. 
Unlike hard investment projects targeting basic productive capacity, soft investment instruments, especially 
ones meant to influence behaviour, usually make an impact in the longer term and undoubtedly produce 
positive externalities. The long-term effects, however, make it difficult to measure and demonstrate their 
impact in the short term, resulting in less frequent opportunities to convert the investment into a profitable 
business. In this sense, R&D activity itself is already a soft investment – its results are mostly intangible, and 
thus, any kind of efforts and progress made are more difficult to demonstrate to the policy-makers. It is 
especially true for programmes encouraging cooperation in R&D between science and business and the 
creation of R&D jobs in companies.  
Taking into account the logical recipients’ attitude towards hard investments enhancing productive capacity 
and soft investments (when both are subsidised), it is not surprising to find that calls for projects enhancing 
productive capacity are more significantly oversubscribed than calls of financing purely for R&D activities. 
Such imbalance might be one of the factors causing pressure from industrial groups on the government to 
return to grants for companies enhancing productive capacity or similar areas with their activities. Results of 
this pressure clearly appear in the latest presentation by the Ministry of Economics which again proposes to 
allocate around 80 million euros to grants for enterprises undertaking hard investments.16 Unsurprisingly, the 
proposal has gained enthusiastic support from the business community. 
Policy-makers’ willingness to promote hard investments as capital extension or replacement is also 
understandable. There was a case of a clearly promising project, first of a kind production facility dedicated 
to a completely new product with potential to change the dynamics of the existing markets. The project, 
however, took too much time to discover the right methods of production, struggled to develop a market for 
their product and faced especially serious problems with generating sales. The company even had sought 
bankruptcy protection, and recently became insolvent. When it comes to such projects, attitudes towards the 
funding agencies and the owners of the companies would be of high significance. Namely, the attitudes of 
the government, and, even more so, the attitudes of the European Commission and the EU Audit Authority 
will affect policy choices in the future far more than any other type of policy recommendations by the EC. As 
an example, if the mentioned case will result in financial correction, it could contribute to the government 
seeking ways to finance the less risky capital extension projects overall in the future. The report of the State 
Controller regarding conclusions based on revision Nr.24.1-12/2014 with regards to sustainability of EU 
Funding investments mentions several failed projects and, as a result, calls for a less risky approach17. The 
report does not specify the reason behind calling for a less risky approach, however, one of the possible 
interpretations could be signs of more ambitious and challenging project avoidance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 The Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia, “Plānotais Atbalsts 2014.-2020.,” accessed April 22, 2015, 
https://www.em.gov.lv/lv/es_fondi/planotais_atbalsts_2014__2020_/. 
17http://www.lrvk.gov.lv/uploads/reviziju-zinojumi/2014/2.4.1-12_2014/informativais-
zinojums_elfla_eraf_07.05.2015_tirraksts.pdf 
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Table 2. ESIF investments managed by VIAA by activity. (Source: Data provided by VIAA [2015]) 
 Infrastructure 
(thousands of €) 
Other 
(thousands of 
€) 
Total 
(thousands of 
€) 
1.1.1.2. Attraction of Human Resources to Science 1 016  66 656  67 672  
2.1.1.1. Improvement of IT Infrastructure and IT 
System for Research Needs 
61 414   61 414  
2.1.1.2. Support to International Cooperation Projects 
in Research and Technologies (EUREKA, 7th FP, etc.) 
284  4 668  4 952  
2.1.1.3.1. Development of Research Infrastructure 103 836   103 836  
2.1.1.3.2. Improvement of IT Infrastructure and IT 
System for Research Needs 
14 961   14 961  
Total 181 511  71 324  252 835  
 
Tendencies to concentrate on hard investment are also visible in the context of public research infrastructure. 
Infrastructure investments amount to €181m, which constitutes 72% of total investment in R&D (Table 2). 
The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia in its answers to Parliament on January 
201418 notes that innovation capacity includes capacity of the human resources and international 
competitiveness and research infrastructure. Thus, investments in infrastructure should be balanced with 
investments in human resources development and creation. The latest research shows that currently (as of 
January 2014) acquisitions of new buildings, laboratories and equipment do not balance with investment in 
human resources, i.e. there are not enough researchers in many institutions.19 
Lessons learned 
The period 2007-2013 witnessed the financial crisis of 2008-2009 when SF funding was crucial to public 
research organisations to maintain their operations. At that time, the government organised SF programmes 
in such a way that funding was provided based on demonstrated need, without opening it up to a competition 
based on excellence. Several important lessons regarding research and innovation policies have been learned 
from this past experience: 
 A mismatch between infrastructure and human resource investments results in an insufficient 
number of researchers given the existing infrastructure, which decreases the effectiveness of 
funding programmes; 
 Lack of trust is the source of bureaucracy in SF funding. Trust building and more focus on peer-
review based results evaluation should replace the excessive process control in ESIF funded projects; 
 Expert-based project evaluation should replace the excessive list of quantitative/qualitative criteria; 
 Current procurement law limits the effective use of funds rather than supports it; 
 In Latvia, there is imbalance between support for hard investments and soft investments in favour 
for hard investments. The business community will always prefer to support hard investments as 
capital extension or replacement when given the option.  
                                                        
18 The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, "Answers to the questions to parliament", Letter 
(Latvijas Republikas Saeimas Kancelejai, 2014. gada 29. janvārī),  
http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS11/saeimalivs_lmp.nsf/0/d75e578f43c07ab9c2257c6f00512fb6/$FILE/1_21-11_14.pdf. 
19 The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, "Diskusiju rezultāti atbilstoši Viedās specializācijas 
jomām", Appendix, (2013. gada 28. decembrī), http://polsis.mk.gov.lv/view.do?id=4608. 
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 Given the past experience with failed projects combined with possible financial consequences for 
Latvia, government agencies are very reluctant to finance risky projects targeting first scale 
manufacturing, advanced manufacturing capabilities and the like; 
 Excessive bureaucracy creates costs for funding agencies as well as R&I performers, however, it is 
not very effective against rent seeking or fraud; 
 Quantitative and formal qualitative criteria should be replaced by peer-review based evaluation of 
the projects; 
 The ambitious numbers of objectives for every programming instrument should be reduced as 
programmes can realistically only focus on a maximum of two or three objectives; 
 Fragmentation of research and innovation systems is an obstacle to implementing competitive 
funding schemes; 
 
There are also several support programmes that succeeded in the past and are recognised by various 
stakeholders and involved agencies interviewed as being good practice, and thus, should be learned 
from. Some examples are presented below.  
 In business support: 
o Centres of Competence; 
o Support for Export activities to companies;  
o Support for Industry Clusters; 
 In R&I and education: 
o Programmes supporting human resources that resulted in retaining some well-educated 
researchers in Latvia; 
o Programmes supporting Research Centres of National Importance20 that started the 
consolidation process of PROs. 
 
SWOT analysis of the governance of ESIF funds 
The SWOT analysis presented below summarises and complements this section’s discussion of EU fund 
governance and is based on both the current situation and the situation experienced during the 2007-2013 
programming period. 
Strengths: 
 High involvement of all stakeholders in the policy development process, including government, 
society, the business community, the education and science sectors; 
 Relatively transparent project selection process. 
 
Weaknesses: 
 Limited human capital in R&I in a very fragmented institutional system;  
 Very fragmented higher education system; 
 Heavy reliance and dependency on the easily accessible Structural Funds (coming from the science, 
and partly business, community); 
 Reliance on “objective” criteria instead of expert assessment, also in cases of fraud or 
misappropriation of the funds; 
 The same approach for evaluation and control used for innovation support projects and 
infrastructure projects; 
                                                        
20 Research Centres of National Importance was an EU funded programme with an aim to concentrate research 
investments to several research centres that are important on a national level. 
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 Inefficient procurement law, and too strict of an interpretation of procurement law by the Public 
Procurement Bureau. 
 
Opportunities: 
 Opportunities to build better policies via entrepreneurial discovery, more innovative approaches and 
greater ambitions; 
 Changes in institutional setting could create the opportunity to build a more efficient and flexible 
system. CFLA may introduce a more productive approach in control and management; 
 Sensible political decisions, such as reduction of public R&I institutions from 43 to 20 by 2020, are 
already being considered and should be implemented in the near future.  
 
Threats: 
 Managing and coordinating authorities displaying conservatism and avoiding new 
approaches/solutions;  
 New coordinating authority may avoid responsibility;  
 The same approach for evaluation and control used for innovation support projects and 
infrastructure projects; 
 Audit-led policy-making by the Ministry of Finance and the European Commission is a threat as it is 
usually strict and inflexible, whereas development of innovation, logically, requires entrepreneurial 
consideration and less-precise/pre-determined objectives. The strict approach does not allow 
discovery through trials; thus, prevents learning from mistakes; 
 Given the extensive influence of interest groups, including but not limited to business organisations, 
a threat to the Smart Specialisation Strategy favouring the interests of such groups emerges. 
 
Policy changes already implemented or foreseen for the period 2014-2020 
The biggest changes regarding policy building began with structural changes in the Ministry of Education and 
Science in March 2013. Development of the Smart Specialisation Strategy (March 2013 - July 2013) was the 
first case in which policy-makers consulted with higher education institutions, public research organisations 
and private businesses at almost every step.  
Undertaking the Smart Specialisation Strategy in 2013 changed the old approach to policy building to 
become a more comprehensive and transparent one. The process was successful in terms of increasing trust 
among stakeholders, especially between the government agencies, ministries and the business community. 
Reflecting on the interviews conducted for this paper one could conclude that trust building was gradual. At 
the start of the process in June 2013, it was very difficult to invite the business representatives to join in the 
discussion due to their perception that their recommendations would not be taken into account. Gradually, 
the business community understood that their input does affect the drafts of the policy documents after all. 
The information flow started increasing along with the increased level of trust in the process.  
The Ministry of Education and Science led the process involving different stakeholders in the policy 
development process. The most significant events witnessed during this process in 2013 and 2014 were the 
following: 
 Series of discussions with the academics, industry and education sectors, which consisted of five 
discussions split between different sectors of the economy: The discussion took place from June 18, 
2013 to June 20, 2013, the results of which were taken into account in the development of the 
Industry Assessment for RIS3 Latvia and the report published after the event.21  
                                                        
21 Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, "Guidelines for Science, Technology Development, and Innovation 2014-
2020". The mentioned report is available at: http://www.ris3.lv/pazinojumi-un-jaunumi/zinojumsirpieejams  
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 Successive discussions regarding design and implementation of RIS3 policy instruments to support 
smart growth: Nine discussions took place from April 16, 2014 to October 15, 2014 with the aim of 
discussing with stakeholders a more appropriate design of policies in order to promote intelligent 
growth.22  
 
Other less formal/documented discussions involving policy-makers and stakeholders occurred on a regular 
basis. The common opinion of industry representatives and representatives of PROs/HEIs is that 
communication and discussions provided sufficient involvement.  
Proposals of new programmes by the Ministry of Education and Science show significant changes present in 
the approach to policy building. For example, a project for a new programme of support for post-doctoral 
research23 has only one goal – the development of human capital. It has only two related objectives: (1) 
improved opportunities to begin a career in scientific institutions, higher education institutions and 
enterprises; and, (2) improvement of research competencies. International experts will perform an evaluation 
of applications based on three criteria: excellence, impact, and implementation. This national funding 
programme is also designed to give priority to proposals that have already proven to be of high quality. The 
prioritised proposals will, more precisely, be the ones that have applied to H202024, passed the thresholds but 
did not receive financing. The programme is expected to accept applications beginning in July 2015. Such 
programme design features are significant improvements – even when compared to relatively recent ones 
approved of last year.  
To summarise, the policy changes implemented, or foreseen, for the period 2014- 2020 and related to the 
Smart Specialisation Strategy are as follows: 
 Transparent and comprehensive policy-building process 
 Focus on peer-review and international expertise in evaluation and monitoring of the projects 
 More focus on building human capacity in the area of research and innovation 
 Focus on consolidation of fragmented higher education and research systems 
 A new approach to policy design - fewer objectives and goals, more focus on innovation and closer 
to market approach 
 More focus on building of excellence in science 
 Entrepreneurial discovery as part of the policy cycle 
 More experimentation in policy building  
 
It is expected that the process started by the Smart Specialisation Strategy would continue and provide 
constant feedback on policy successes and issues. 
                                                        
22 State Education Development Agency (Throughout the report the Latvian abbreviation - VIAA - is used), "Discussion 
materials". Available at: http://viaa.gov.lv/lat/zinatnes_inovacijas_progr/viedas_specializacijas_iev/diskusiju_materiali/  
23 The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, "PĒCDOKTORANTŪRAS PĒTNIECĪBAS ATBALSTS" (Riga, 
2015. gada martā). Available at: http://www.izm.gov.lv/images/strukturfondi/IZM_SAM111_Post_dok_170315.pdf  
24 More precisely the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) Individual Fellowships (IF) 
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3. FACTORS THAT SUPPORT OR LIMIT THE NATIONAL PARTICIPATION 
IN R&D CALLS FUNDED BY SF/ESIF. 
Reflecting on the interviews that were conducted and on the research carried out using publicly-available 
sources, it should be noted that there were no significant factors restricting the technical accessibility of 
SF/ESIF or reducing the R&D performers’ motivations to participate in such calls. Nevertheless, there are 
factors that have had an effect on national participation in the calls for funding in a slightly different sense 
in relation to the Latvia’s limited capacity for absorption of EU funds. This section presents a discussion of 
these factors, their reasons and impacts. 
 Limited absorption capacity of SF/ESIF funds 
In general, in Latvia there is a mismatch between available R&D&I funding for enterprises and the current 
structure of the industry and the number of researchers. 
As mentioned, the R&D sector in Latvia has insufficiently developed when considering its human resources. 
The number of jobs in research and engineering is low and less knowledge intensive industries prevail (low-
middle tech industries constitute 82% of manufacturing). According to the Ministry of Education and Science, 
the total number of R&D Full Time Equivalent (FTE) jobs in Latvia in 2013 was only 5,396; 3,237 in PROs and 
HEIs; 1,178 in the government; and 981 in the industry.25 For reference, in 2011 the number of researchers 
FTE per thousand of labour force in Latvia was 3.826, whereas in Lithuania and Estonia respectively 5.727 and 
6.528. Another source, the “Informative Report on Medium and Long-term Labour Market Forecasts”,29 
prepared by the Ministry of Economics, notes that the issue is unlikely to be resolved in the next five years. 
The report forecasts that there will be a surplus of specialists in the humanities and social sciences (a surplus 
of approximately 20,000 by 2020) and a shortage of life science, information and communications 
technology (ICT) and engineering science specialists (a shortage of approximately 20,000 by 2020).  
According to the interviewees, this issue has not been adequately addressed through either efforts or 
programmes on a policy-making level that could motivate businesses to gradually shift to more knowledge 
intensive industries or create more permanent R&D jobs. 
Moreover, as explained in section 2.1.1., opportunities to receive grants in both R&D fields and activities 
enhancing the productive capacity of the economy via hard investment as capital extension or replacement, 
shift the interests of the business organisations towards capital extension or replacement. This results in 
more grants being given and more projects being developed in the hard investment area, and thus, leaves the 
problem of the low number of R&D&I jobs unresolved.  
All of these factors result in technical limitations on Latvia’s ability to absorb the available SF/ESIF funds in 
R&D&I activities, especially given that the funding opportunities have only increased since the introduction of 
Horizon 2020. More information on the absorptive capacity limitation problem in Latvia is presented in 
Appendix E. 
                                                        
25 Ministry of Education and Science of Republic of Latvia, "SĀKOTNĒJAIS NOVĒRTĒJUMS „Pēcdoktorantūras pētniecības 
atbalsts” Eiropas Savienības struktūrfondi 2014.-2020.gadam", 2015. gada, 4, 
http://www.izm.gov.lv/images/strukturfondi/IZM_SN_SAM111_Post-doc_160315.pdf. 
26 Deloitte (2014). Researchers’ Report 2014. Country Profile: Latvia. Retrieved from:  
http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_policies/country_files/Latvia_Country_Profile_RR2014_FINAL.pdf  
27 Deloitte (2014). Researchers’ Report 2014. Country Profile: Lithuania. Retrieved from:  
http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_policies/country_files/Lithuania_Country_Profile_RR2014_FINAL.pdf  
28 Deloitte (2014). Researchers’ Report 2014. Country Profile: Estonia. Retrieved from:  
http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_policies/country_files/Estonia_Country_Profile_RR2014_FINAL.pdf  
29 Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia, "Informative Report on Medium and Long-Term Labour Market 
Forecasts" (Riga: Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia, 2014. gada 12. jūnijā), 84,  
https://em.gov.lv/files/tautsaimniecibas_attistiba/DT2014_1.pdf. 
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Tendency to inefficient use of funds 
During the financial crisis, the budgets of the research organisations were cut significantly (by up to 30%), 
and SF funding was used for compensation of the budget cuts. In many cases, the programmes were 
necessary to simply maintain research organisations’ operations rather than develop them. For PROs, SF 
made, and still makes, up a significant part of the organisation’s budget. While such an approach was 
reasonable and effective during the crisis, the consequences of it have created obstacles for the efficient use 
of EU funds. The extensive dependence of some organisations on the funds imposes limitations on the 
creation of a competitive funding distribution system. For them, losing funding for a project in any of the 
calls would mean that the organisation would not be able to continue to finance its basic operations. Thus, in 
the period 2007-2013, R&D calls funded by structural funds were, to a large extent, characterised by their 
need, as opposed to competition expected by its nature. In combination with the limited number of 
researchers and engineers, excessive fragmentation of the research base and funding that is dependent on 
the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) has created an acute lack of incentives for R&D developers to strive 
for excellence. 
It should be noted, however, that this was not always the case – the interviews revealed that there are 
multiple examples of programmes where SF were used efficiently and played an important role in the 
development of the R&D in Latvia. The SF programmes were an important factor in maintaining some of the 
leading scientists in Latvia by providing them with the opportunity to fund their research and build excellence. 
For them, international funding sources such as Horizon 2020 provide an important opportunity for further 
prosperity. 
Limitations on commercial use of the research infrastructure 
The possibilities to convert research infrastructure usage from non-commercial to commercial are limited by 
state aid rules although this infrastructure is funded by SF. These conditions commonly end up discouraging 
ambitious projects related to research infrastructure development, especially given that not only academics 
but also business representatives are potentially interested in using this infrastructure. This situation is 
limiting industry participation in project design and selection. At the same time, based on the interview 
results, businesses express their interest in the possibility of converting research infrastructure from pure 
research to commercial use under the right market conditions. However, they are not ready to participate in 
financing such infrastructure from the beginning. Such limitations lead to research infrastructure not meeting 
the current Latvian R&I industry’s needs and thus have a limited impact on the transformation of the 
economy. According to a paper by Andrea M. Herrmann, industry transformation occurs only if available 
research infrastructure and capacities are relatively close to the scope of current industry challenges.30  
Heavy administrative burden 
According to the interviewees’ responses, the current funding management system was created and 
developed under the tasks and rules of programming period 2004-200631 when the primary function of SF 
funds was capital investment to improve production according to international standards. Given that the 
goals were relatively easy to measure and could be verified by a third party, namely a certification institution 
of a particular standard, all the extensive controlling, selection and evaluation procedures only served to 
complicated participation. Applicants were expected to provide a very precise description of their predicted 
steps, along with elaborate business and investment plans. Plans had to be carefully followed and any 
changes, if requested by the applicant, had to go through a long legal process to be approved, frequently 
taking up to six months. Cancellation or failure of such projects resulted in the Agency requesting the funding 
be returned.  
                                                        
30 Andrea M Herrmann, "Choosing and Successfully Sustaining Competitive Strategies in the European Pharmaceutical 
Industry", (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2008. gada). 
31 Latvia joined the EU in 2004. 
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The same rules and regulations were carried over to the next period in 2007-2013 when programmes were, 
on many occasions, focused on the innovation and development of new products. Taking into account that 
uncertainty is an inevitable aspect of innovation, the same principles of programme design – requiring the 
outcomes of the project to correspond to the initial promised goals and timing precisely – were no longer 
appropriate, although they still applied. According to the interviews, the outcome of such divergence was 
beneficiaries reporting results that would be considered in line with the initial plans rather than describe the 
actual results achieved even though, in many cases, the results achieved or the products created were 
significantly different from those proposed. Such examples show that innovation cannot be approached using 
the same methods that are used for infrastructure projects and the like. 
 The inefficient procurement procedures 
Procurement procedures for EU structural funds are supposed to prevent fraud, rent seeking and agency 
problems. However, the mechanism results in the opposite in many cases. Most of the respondents 
recognised that the current overly bureaucratic procedures of procurement produce inefficiencies and 
contribute to the excessive administrative burden on R&I performers. As mentioned by the interviewees, 
foreign companies and producers of materials or equipment are often reluctant to cooperate with the tender 
candidates due to the excessive documentation required and the relatively low threshold for complicated 
public tender procedures. Thus, to be able to buy the goods from the producers, applicants tend to involve 
intermediaries, the only task of which is a formal application of the procurement process, provision and 
preparation of the necessary documentation and transfer of the goods. Typically, such a service costs around 
20% of the original cost, sometimes even more, and that is how low thresholds associated with tenders can 
end up increasing the overall prices of the tender participants’ products significantly. 
Inefficiencies in the current procurement procedure are also an obstacle for the government agencies. The 
government is facing some problems relating to the recruitment of international experts for evaluation of 
various projects, as the law does not allow hiring experts based on their expertise but rather on the basis of 
their fees. 
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4. ENHANCING OR LIMITING THE SYNERGIES 
The synergy between Structural Fund programmes and the Framework Programmes was the most difficult 
concept to comprehend or comment on to the interviewees. Hence, it could be concluded that the synergetic 
features of the two funding opportunities are either not very apparent or highlighted in Latvia. The few 
synergy-enhancing mechanisms in place were identified during the preparation of this report.  
As presented in section 5, the interviews with R&I performers revealed that potential benefits from 
participation in FP7/H2020 programmes are significant and thus serve as a powerful motivation to 
participate. As discussed in the same section, to successfully apply for such programmes, Latvian 
researchers, engineers and organisations have to consistently increase their international exposure and 
networking, build their R&I capabilities, have a solid track record of performance in advance to have a chance 
at being invited to join an international consortium. In this context, ESIF, if used efficiently, can be viewed as 
a valuable tool having the potential to facilitate admission to the Framework Programmes. On the other 
hand, desire to participate in FP/H2020 programmes can work as a stimulus to strive for excellence and thus, 
put any prior funds to their most efficient use. Hence, it could be said that the existence of FP/H2020 already 
works as a cohesion tool. 
Based on the interviewees’ opinion, actual activities of the governmental bodies that would enhance the 
synergies are very limited – the government can facilitate sequential upstream funding and/or provide 
alternative funding to that of FPs. These are the two means raised by the R&D performers for facilitating the 
synergies of the different funding programmes.    
In the first case, SF/ESIF provides means for R&I performers to build their capabilities and international 
exposure. The interviews show, however, that following this approach, SF programmes can include measures 
motivating and requiring beneficiaries to look for external funding after the project; for example, a limit can 
be applied, stating that a participant can apply and receive funding only once without finding external sources 
such as business organisations, international funds or Horizon 2020, afterwards. 
The government providing alternative funding in this context would mean provision of financing for R&I 
performers who passed the threshold but did not receive funding from FP/H2020. Such a practice would first 
increase the probability of a project being funded as a result of participation in such a competition as seen in 
Horizon 2020; thus, have the potential to increase the number of applicants. Secondly, it would ensure an 
efficient and worthwhile use of the alternative funds given the quality of projects that apply for H2020 and 
pass the threshold. However, it would be difficult to implement practically as the alternative funding would 
have to be provided by all member states researchers of which are a part of the financed consortium. If a 
consensus of the respective member states is not reached, attempts to finance only a part of the 
consortium’s FP7 project by SF/ESIF may result in a negative value given that networking and cooperation are 
considered to be a very important part of the FP7/H2020 project value, from the perspective of the 
interviewees.  
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5. PUSH – PULL FACTORS FOR R&I PERFORMERS TO PARTICIPATE IN 
FP7/H2020 
Competitive programmes (i.e. Horizon 2020 and FP programmes) wherein R&I projects are carried out in 
cooperation with foreign organisations were recognised by the interviewees as being especially important 
due to having the most potential to close the innovation gap. Given the collaborative nature of the 
programmes, participation in them depends not only on factors related to R&I performers in Latvia but also 
those in other member states, especially in the more developed countries. The most important factor for 
successfully participating in FP or H2020 calls, according to the interviewees, is networking with international 
peers and reputation. Networking can take a variety of forms, such as private contacts and business/research 
contacts. Even indirect contacts – having previous experience of cooperation or contact with organisations or 
individuals related to other members of the consortium of interest - were pointed out by the interviewees as 
an important participation facilitator. 
Participation patterns of Horizon 2020 show that R&I developers from the more developed member states 
are more likely to form a successful consortium; thus, the initiatives to establish consortiums usually 
originate in these countries. On the other hand, R&I performers from the lagging economies, like Latvia, have 
significantly higher chances of receiving the funds if they are invited to join such consortiums. In some cases, 
research organisations from the cohesion economies could be - and, as the interviews revealed, usually are - 
invited by the foreign and more experienced market players without possessing any unique capabilities that 
other members did not already have. According to the interviews from the participants in FP, often the 
members that initiated the consortium could carry out all the necessary activities themselves, however, 
having limited resources, they choose to focus on the field of their comparative advantage and outsource 
other activities to newly attracted partners. 
Having established the principles of FP participation from the emerging economy’s perspective, one could 
then summarise and categorise the existing push/pull factors in the following manner.  
Motivating – advantages and factors that stimulate the R&I performers in Latvia to seek invitations from 
international consortiums: 
o Opportunities to learn from more advanced partners, possibly leading to more business 
opportunities in the future, were mentioned as the key driver in participating in the programmes; 
o Being able to operate under fewer rules and restrictions, as Horizon 2020 is more results focused. 
This motivating factor was mentioned by business entities (as well as by PROs) that have had 
success in the Framework Programmes and are looking forward to participating in new ones 
because they find FP/H2020 less limiting and more business oriented than SF (ESIF) calls; 
o Opportunity to achieve more appealing financial returns if a proposal gets funded;  
o Building international exposure and networks is an especially appealing factor as all successful 
participants in the programme are export/outward oriented.  
 
Enabling factors – factors that could have the potential to increase the likelihood of an R&I performer from 
Latvia being invited to join a consortium: 
o Developed networks and reputation of a local or international environment, or a personal one. 
Networks were mentioned by the previous programme participants as a fundamental requirement 
to be recognised; 
o Experience in cooperation with other foreign partners, preferably under similar circumstances; 
o Possession of valuable knowledge, competence or capabilities; 
o Developed strategic vision and ability to execute the strategy at an organisational or individual level 
is required to make use of the opportunity. In most cases of successful participation in FP7, 
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organisations or individuals who demonstrate strategic and long-term thinking, as well as an ability 
to execute the strategy, are known to be able to deliver results. 
 
Barriers – demotivating factors and a lack of capabilities related to the R&I performers from Latvia that 
limit the likelihood of an invitation and limit the motivation to participate: 
o The costs and risks for project coordinators (R&I participants from the developed member states) 
associated with involvement of an unfamiliar partner from, for instance, a lagging economy, are 
high. This makes the developed country participants less likely to invite organisations from lagging 
countries (like Latvia), and these organisations from lagging economies less likely to attempt to 
attract their attention;   
o Lack of strong commitment of the governmental bodies to co-finance infrastructure that is not 
financed by the FP/H2020; 
o FP7/H2020 “competing” for researchers’ attention with the national funding opportunities. National 
funding is generally easier to access and have a much higher probability of success. One might 
speculate that making the national funding competitive could work as a strong motivating factor 
for participating in Horizon 2020. This could be complemented with an introduction of clauses 
limiting the national funding available to researchers or institutions without attracting additional 
external funding; 
o Limited research base excellence and fragmented research and development industry; 
o Lack of awareness about the programme of the business community; 
o Lack of NCP support for potential programme applicants – many interviewees rated it as minimal or 
non-existent.  
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6. POLICY INSTRUMENTS FACILITATING THE PARTICIPATION IN (FP7) 
H2020/(SF) ESIF 
The key message from the interviews conducted on instruments facilitating funding participation is that they 
do not play a critical role in affecting R&D participants’ motivation. Programmes, like the Information 
Platforms for EU funds and the National Contact Point, are meant to provide information and guidance to 
SF/ESIF and FP/H2020 applicants respectively. However, the actual applicants identified them as having value 
only in the context of attracting new applicants – informing those who were not already aware of such 
funding opportunities or explaining the general application procedures.  
The National Contact Point 
The National Contact Point (NCP) is a structure responsible for the provision of information on Horizon 2020. 
Since 2014, NCP has been no longer subordinated to the Higher Education Study Development Centre under 
the Ministry of Science and Education but it has been rather managed by the State Education Development 
Agency instead. Reflecting on the interview results, it could be said that the role of NCP is increasingly 
important due to this shift of subordination, as being under the oversight of the executive body of education, 
science and research programmes (the VIAA) will bring the NCP closer to the needs of potential beneficiaries 
and applicants to the FP/H2020. 
Successful FP participants, who were interviewed for this report, rated the support of NCP in the range of 
almost none to non-existent. The lack of support from NCP was especially emphasised by the representatives 
of business entities due to their impression that the organisation’s activities were mainly focused on 
providing guidance to higher education institutions and public research organisations rather than the business 
community. Such mismanagement could be one of the potential explanations for the low level of 
participation in FP programmes. 
Given the overall negative evaluations of NCP activities as well as the interviewees’ general requirement of 
radical improvement in NCP performance, the change in subordination could be a positive sign towards 
improving the programme’s supporting participation in FP.  
Other instruments facilitating FP7/H2020 participation 
As noted by the interviewees working in R&D, all the necessary information regarding the H2020 project, for 
instance, is publicly available and easily accessible. Thus, the informative function of the National Contact 
Point, discussed in the previous subsection, is, from their perspective, not very relevant. For the participants 
that are familiar with the funding programme, different types of support regarding FP7/H2020 participation 
were pointed out – in particular, all the policies or conditions enabling instruments that would cover part of 
the costs of preparation for Horizon 2020. The existing examples of such policy instruments are: 
 Funding provided by the Academy of Science for successful FP7 (H2020) project proposals which 
pass the threshold. The funding can be used for any purpose and it works more like a motivational 
tool; 
 Some of the ESIF funding is available to cover traveling, networking and some other preparation 
costs that interested applicants incur prior to the project commencing. The impact and effectiveness 
of this instrument should still be evaluated.  
 
The general conclusion reached by the stakeholders interviewed is that it may be sensible if any support for 
participation in the Horizon 2020 programme was available on a permanent basis because ESIF programmes 
may not be flexible and responsive enough to be able to match the timing of different Horizon 2020 calls. 
Interviewees agreed that provision of funding only for preparation costs if the project in question passed the 
quality threshold might help contribute to avoiding excess bureaucracy. The amount per project mentioned in 
the interviews was a maximum of €30,000. 
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7. EVALUATION AND MONITORING MECHANISMS  
Based on the “Law on Management of European Union Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund”32, the bodies 
presented below are in charge of the monitoring and evaluation of the SF/ESIF management and 
implementation. In addition, Ministries and executive bodies subordinate them to contribute to the evaluation 
and monitoring of projects in their respective fields – the description of the Ministries and other institutions 
involved in the governance of R&D funds are presented in section 2.  
Managing Authority (MA) 
The role of the Managing Authority in Latvia is undertaken by the Ministry of Finance with two of its 
departments being in charge of EU fund governance; the EU Funds Strategy Department and the EU Funds 
Monitoring Department. MA is responsible for ensuring the effective management and implementation of EU 
funds, the existence of a reliable monitoring mechanism and the evaluation of EU funds. With the help of 
other institutions and consultants, the Managing Authority prepares programming documents ensuring 
compliance with the EU partnership principles as well as intersectoral coordination of different EU funds, i.e. 
SF and Cohesion Fund. In 2008, following one of its duties presented in the “Law on Management of 
European Union Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund”, the Managing Authority established, and is still 
maintaining, the EU funds management and information system (MIS)  
Audit Authority 
The Ministry of Finance, or more specifically, its European Union Funds Audit Department, is also fulfilling the 
role of an Audit Authority. The Audit Authority is liable for providing the EC, the Minister of Finance and the 
State Secretary with assessments of the soundness of EU funds’ management and control systems as well 
as assurance related to expenditure and transactions.  
Monitoring Committee (MC) 
The Monitoring Committee was established to ensure an effective EU fund monitoring system, which would 
pay special attention to the priorities and goals of the operational programmes. The Committee acts 
according to the rules and regulations set by the Cabinet of Ministers. The Monitoring Committee is 
composed of representatives from Certifying and Paying Authorities, the Audit Authority, Cooperation and 
Responsible Institutions, the Managing Authority. Moreover, it also includes social and regional partners and 
non-governmental sector representatives (See Figure 2). The Committee is chaired by the Head of the 
Managing Authority. 
Procurement Monitoring Bureau 
The Procurement Monitoring Bureau has a duty to provide examinations of the documentation and the 
process of procurement. 
The “Guidelines for the Development of Science, Technology and Innovation 2014–2020”, among other 
documents, provide the basis for defining the overall goals and macroeconomic indicators for the RIS3 
monitoring system. To ensure that the monitoring system of RIS3 takes into account the broad scope of the 
potential impact with respect to public investment in science, technology development and innovations, three 
monitoring levels were introduced; namely, overall goals of the specialisation strategy, macro and micro level 
indicators. (For illustration see Figure 3). The overall goals include an increase in investment in R&D as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), better position in the EU Innovation Union Scoreboard and 
efficiency in the processing industry. The macroeconomic level indicators, among others, include private 
sector investments in R&D as a percentage of total investments, proportion of innovative companies, the 
number of R&D personnel and graduates in R&D related fields. Micro level indicators are the indicators 
                                                        
32 http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=153465 
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contributing towards achieving the macro level indicators (available in Appendix C together with their relation 
to the ESIF support programmes and national initiatives). The report “Smart specialization strategy 
monitoring system”33 indicates that the average annual funding related to RIS3 counts only 1.3 percent of the 
average amount invested in the economy over the past three years34 in Latvia. This, according to the 
monitoring report, means that the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have to separate the effects of 
factors extrinsic to the RIS3 properly, such as other policy measures (energy policy, education policy, 
improvements in the business environment and others).  
Few problems associated with this approach could be identified: 
The focus of the monitoring and evaluation system is still put on R&D spending in monetary terms rather 
than on increase in volume of R&D activity (following the latter approach the number of R&D jobs 
would be the best proxy for measurement of impact); 
The results of policies regarding human capital development become apparent only in the long term 
which might even exceed the policy cycle (change of authorities), therefore, defining and tracking 
some short term effects, that would indicate gradual improvement, could be necessary. 
 
Figure 3. The concept of the RIS3 monitoring35 
During the interviews with various stakeholders, several fundamental problems with the overall system of 
evaluation and its monitoring mechanisms were mentioned, including:  
 Monitoring based on the process control: Managers of monitoring projects are not experts in the 
field; therefore, control is focused on the legal aspects rather than allowing a level of flexibility 
based on common sense and expertise;  
 The excessive administrative burden for R&I performers, arising partly due to the previously 
mentioned lack of trust between the stakeholders, complicates the project evaluation and monitoring 
procedures as well. The reporting requirements are commonly too detailed and too demanding. It 
drives the funding recipients to produce extensive reports that do not necessarily and accurately 
depict the actual situation36. This reduces the transparency of the project implementation process. 
Many interviewees acknowledged this issue and expressed views that a potential solution might be 
                                                        
33 Report by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia; Accessible at: 
http://tap.mk.gov.lv/lv/mk/tap/?pid=40334802&mode=mk&date=2014-10-21 ; 
34As of March 2015 
35 Source: “Smart Specialisation Strategy Monitoring System” by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of 
Latvia.  
36 For instance, reports that require hourly based descriptions of progress/work were commonly admitted to be made up 
to a large extent. As interviewees explained, such an issue occurs simply due to R&D performers not planning and 
working on hourly basis. 
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based on the example of the Horizon 2020 programme by adopting a similar system of project 
selection and shifting the evaluation elements more towards the peer-review based result rather 
than the process control. 
 
The local pool of experts for peer-review is insufficient which creates grounds to doubt the likelihood, and 
availability, of impartial judgement. The insights from the interviews suggest outsourcing to international 
experts as one of the solutions for this problem. As of June 2015, there have already been positive 
developments made in order to address these issues - the latest proposal from the Ministry of Education and 
Science for support of postdoctoral research projects37 presently includes all the conditions listed above.  
                                                        
37 The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, "PĒCDOKTORANTŪRAS PĒTNIECĪBAS ATBALSTS". 
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8. TAKE-UP OF PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH RESULTS 
Technology Transfer Offices  
With an aim of encouraging innovation and, consequently, boosting EU’s competitiveness on a global scale, 
the Technology Transfer Office (also known as Technology Transfer Centre) initiative was launched. The core 
role of Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) is to assist PROs in managing their intellectual assets; so they 
could be developed further and have potential for commercial exploitation. Once technologies developed in 
PROs are properly protected by TTOs, marketing strategies are implemented to facilitate their market take-
up. Therefore, TTOs are expected to play an important role in closing the gap between research and 
innovation. HEIs and research institutes qualify for support in the context of establishment and operation of 
TTOs.  
Technology transfer development is one of the tasks presented in the National Reform Programme of Latvia 
and the National Development Plan for 2007-2013. The call for TTO launch took place in 2005 by the 
Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia. The call resulted in six successful applications, and with the 
first support programme, funded solely from the national budget. Six TTOs were established at the Latvian 
HEIs. As a result of the second call in 2008, eight more TTOs were funded. 
The interviews conducted for the purposes of this research revealed that the Latvian TTOs are facing a skill 
gap. The interviewees mentioned that there is a lack of experts that would be capable of both coherent 
understanding of the research brought forward by the PROs and a vision for commercialisation of it. 
Competence Centres 
A Competence Centre (CC) is a commercial entity founded by enterprises and research organisations which 
acts as an R&D project manager, coordinator and financing instrument exercising a high degree of autonomy 
in project selection, change and administrative decisions. It only finances the R&D activities of enterprises 
and research institutions having potential commercial value. A Competence Centre usually only provides co-
financing and, in turn, requests co-financing from enterprise(s) sponsoring the project. Government 
involvement in controls of the daily operation of the Competence Centre is limited, mostly focusing on 
procurement procedures and controlling whether the Competence Centre is financing only R&D spending. The 
decisions of the institution are made by its Council which mostly consists of business and science 
representatives. Decisions are made quickly, and there is the possibility of cancelling the project or replacing 
it with a better one without any penalty if the project becomes commercially or technically unfeasible. 
Competence Centres are allowed to find the best model of operation and have operated relatively well doing 
that. This success of CCs can mostly be attributable to their financing model that is able to adjust and thus 
take advantage of windows of opportunity in the context of innovation.38 Six existing Competence Centres 
have also significantly improved the communication between businesses and PROs.   
Based on the interviews carried out for the S2E project as well as the meetings that took place in the process 
of RIS3 development, interviewees from the business community recognised the Competence Centre 
programme as an example of best practice. They listed the following benefits: 
 Fast, business-like decision-making process: The business recognised that it is the first programme 
designed truly to support innovation. It is mostly emphasised that the primary reason for the positive 
outcome was based on the process and possibility of replacing unsuccessful projects quickly and 
inexpensively.39 
 Providing the possibility to understand the capacity of research organisations. 
                                                        
38 Opportunity windows herein refer to the point in time when the market opportunity matches the knowledge, 
research/innovation capacity, potential production capacity, and technology available. 
39 State Education Development Agency (SEDA), "VIAA » Viedās specializācijas ieviešana RIS3 » Diskusiju materiāli", State 
Education Developement Agency (VIAA) Discussion regarding EU funds policy instruments for Strategy of Smart 
Specialization, skatīts 2015. gada 21. aprīlī, http://viaa.gov.lv/lat/viedas_specializacijas_iev/diskusiju_materiali/. 
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 Enabling more efficient and faster communication between the business and science communities, 
possible by means of money. 
 Because the number of R&D jobs in business is limited, Competence Centres have adequate finances 
available to encourage companies to plan R&D activities relatively long term while creating new 
permanent R&D jobs. 
 
Programmes with similar “soft” effects are “Support of Industry Clusters”40 and “Support for Export Activities 
of Companies”41. The Industry Cluster support programme offers a maximum funding of over €400.000 per 
cluster in order to facilitate cooperation between business entities, research, education and other 
organisations. The programme aims at boosting international competitiveness and innovation through 
covering costs of activities like cluster marketing and market research, human resource training within the 
industry, promotion of cluster international cooperation, promoting collaboration with the science community 
and others. The programme - supporting export activities - is under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Economics and is coordinated by the Latvian Investment and Development Agency (LIAA). The programme 
promotes the export facilitating activities, brought forward by individual merchants and associations of them, 
public and port authorities, municipalities and others. The aid is intended for encouraging activities like 
participation in international exhibitions, international conferences while introduction or promotion of project’s 
goods and services is taking place, as well as trade missions, contact exchanges, potential trade partner 
visits. Other types of activities eligible for the support under this programme are market research and 
assessment of products’, partners’, merchants’ conformity and others. The programme offers a total of 
€13.759.576 from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) with a maximum per applicant funding 
amount of €200.000 for three years. 
Problems limiting the take-up of public sector research results 
Some proposals for, and possibilities of, improvement the take-up of public sector research results are 
identified in the “Strategy of Innovative Growth of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry of Latvia”.42 Mainly, 
the problem of the current law is that it requires the researchers to cover all the costs associated with the 
intellectual property even before the commercial value of the product is proven. Potential losses in the 
market for individual researchers are significant if the product turns out to be financially unfeasible or 
unsuccessful. Thus, it reduces the number of researchers pursuing the commercialisation of their research. 
This issue could potentially be addressed by allowing the transfer of intellectual property rights from the 
research institution to the researcher at the initial stage of the commercialisation process. Such setup may 
include the condition that the researcher would cover all the costs associated with the development of the 
intellectual property only in the event that it achieves a commercial success. It is expected that such change 
could improve the take-up of public research results. In such a case, researchers can use the intellectual 
property as part of the capital of the newly established start-up; and thus, this makes easier to acquire 
financing. On the other hand, it creates a greater likelihood of a research organisation being paid for such 
research.  
Latvia is a small and relatively high-income country; therefore, it has a disadvantage in scale economies, i.e. 
manufacturing sectors. Latvia cannot compete in this context by increasing the scale and reducing production 
costs like some other economies. Latvia’s population is less than 2 million and its GNI is $22,510 per capita.43 
At the same time, the country’s medium-low and low-tech industries still constitute to 82% of the entire 
manufacturing industry. The size of the country also limits the possibilities for diversification in its innovation 
                                                        
40 More information available at: http://www.liaa.gov.lv/invest-latvia/competitive-advantages/business-incentives/other  
41 More information available in Latvian at: 
http://www.liaa.gov.lv/files/liaa/attachments/2014.12.08.arejo_tirgu_apgusana.pdf  
42 Latvijas Ķīmijas un farmācijas uzņēmēju asociācija, "Latvijas Ķīmijas un Farmācijas industrijas inovatīvas izaugsmes 
stratēģija" (Latvijas Ķīmijas un farmācijas uzņēmēju asociācija, 2014. gada decembrī). 
43 Gross National Income at Purchase Power Parity in 2013; The World Bank, "GNI per capita ranking, Atlas method and 
PPP based | Data", The World Bank Data, 2015. gada 23. aprīlī, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GNI-per-capita-
Atlas-and-PPP-table. 
31 
 
and productive capabilities, and it poses difficulties to create all the necessary cutting-edge science and 
technology for the new generic technologies. This effectively limits companies to niche and specialty 
products. Even if Latvia has some sectors with scale intensive production capabilities, these are limited to 
single enterprises, such as the role of Latvijas Finieris44 in plywood production. Consequently, companies and 
PROs have to seek foreign partners in larger markets in order to be able to adopt the research for 
commercial uses. 
To illustrate a case of research result take-up not being feasible for Latvian market players a large 
international enterprise from Latvia could be mentioned. The company was essentially participating in the 
FP7 project only so as to make contact with potential customers. As for the actual research 
commercialisation, the company estimated that in order to take-up research results, it should invest at least 
€25 million in a trial production facility to test the feasibility of the production of the new material developed 
during the Framework Programme project. The size of the necessary upfront investment was too large given 
the uncertainty of the testing outcomes, even if there was a certain possibility of additional state support. 
However, as it was discussed before, willingness of policy-makers to support enterprises to undertake such 
risky, first of a kind production or advanced manufacturing, projects is not yet clear. It will depend on the final 
resolution regarding failed advanced manufacturing or first of a kind projects from 2007-2013. Resolution of 
failed past projects will define whether Latvia will look to support such projects in the future. 
  
                                                        
44 http://www.finieris.lv/  
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9. COUNTRY TAILORED POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
Several country tailored policy recommendations could be drawn from the research conducted for the 
purpose of drafting this report. Some of the recommendations are logical conclusions that follow the analysis 
presented in the previous sections; others are explained in more detail here.  
Enhancing the human resource capacities in the R&I sector  
When it comes to the R&I policy in general, and the Smart Specialisation Strategy in particular, more 
attention should be paid to the creation of new and permanent R&I jobs and changes to the structure of the 
industry rather than focusing on R&I spending itself. The current number of R&I jobs (less than 6000 across 
all sectors) is too little. The goal of R&I funding should be to increase the volume of R&I activities, not to 
inflate price of existing volume of activity. Without increasing the number of R&I jobs, the latter will prevail. 
In a practical sense, it means that R&I funding schemes should be open in the longer term with future 
prospects of funding exceeding current R&D absorptive capacity. Thus it signals to R&D performers that 
creation of new R&D&I capacity via permanent R&I jobs is welcome. Requirements for R&I jobs and the 
volume of funding should be reconsidered if the demand approaches an equilibrium with the available 
funding. Policy makers should avoid situation when business accommodates the regulations in order to 
absorb funding in market success. It should also be mentioned that more attention by the policy-makers 
should be paid to the overall soft measures, affecting the behaviour of market participants, facilitating 
cooperation and coordination, providing support for industrial clusters and projects like the Competence 
Centres. 
Eligibility, monitoring and evaluation policies and procedures should incorporate objective 
assessments by international experts 
The evaluation and monitoring procedures should be modified to rely less on the quantitative or qualitative 
criteria and assign more weight to peer-review based analysis of the results of projects. In a country with 
such a limited pool of experts, making foreign experts involved would help to build a more reliable and 
trusted evaluation system. Overall, the rules of ESI funds’ monitoring and evaluation should be closer to the 
rules of H2020 programmes whenever possible. An example of such case could be a shift from a process-
centred to a results-oriented project management and control process. Such policy adjustments should lead 
to a more reliable project selection process and improve R&I performers’ ability to successfully participate in 
H2020 calls.  
Increasing the importance of CFLA role 
Based on the interview results, it can be concluded that with the purpose of achieving greater and more 
coherent rules regarding Structural Fund management, more responsibility for programme design should be 
given to the Central Finance and Contracting Agency (CFLA). Even though programme design and goals are 
usually set by the Ministries, given that the programmes would be implemented by the CFLA, the proposed 
distribution of tasks might be the more reasonable and efficient way to handle the funds. It could have a 
potential to resolve the overabundance of programme designs. Currently, programmes are designed by 
multiple governmental bodies; and thus, they follow different structures and principles. This, in turn, implies 
that the candidates applying for funding have to introduce themselves with nuances of the programme 
design all over again every time when applying for a programme asserted by a different institution. Placing 
the programme design in the hands of one institution, namely the CFLA, can help standardise this process 
and, by doing that, possibly save some resources of research and business organisations. 
Innovation related policy-making should take into account the entrepreneurial nature of the 
field 
The entrepreneurial discovery principle should be employed not only by the business organisations and PROs, 
but also by the policy-makers. Such a change in practice could be broken down to make the several 
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adjustments that are necessary. Firstly, policy-makers would take into account that most of the policy 
decisions are made under the conditions of limited and/or incomplete information, and most of the initial 
hypotheses could be partly incorrect. Secondly, the correction of such hypotheses under the entrepreneurial 
discovery principle is a constant process stimulated by discovery through interaction with the system, i.e. 
bottom-up feedback. Thirdly, the nature of entrepreneurial discovery requires no penalties be in place for 
being wrong; however preferably there can be penalties when the feedback from the system is ignored. The 
introduction of such an approach would also require some changes on the part of the European Commission, 
as, according to the representatives of the managing authority interviewed, the current system and attitude 
within the EC are not always compatible with the entrepreneurial discovery concept. Without introducing 
these principles, the opportunity costs of the changes (at any level – member state, ministry, department or 
project) are very high; therefore only a few decision makers are willing to take such risks. It mostly results in 
policies that are simply the continuation of old practices. 
Developing effective mechanisms against agency problems related to EU fund usage 
Given the cases discussed regarding the agency problems related to EU funds, it is crucial that policy-makers 
draw their attention to it and attempt to take better measures against short-term rent seeking. In the case of 
Latvia, more focused policy goals and a clearer message pertaining to the current support programmes 
would better align its efforts with the business and science communities, e.g. hard versus soft types of 
investment. 
Mechanisms that could encourage H2020 participation both on the national and EU levels 
Given the low participation rates of Latvian researchers in the Framework Programmes, it is important to 
discuss the actions that can be taken to increase the activity of the R&I actors with respect to the current 
programme, Horizon 2020. Firstly, raising awareness about the programme, especially within the business 
sector, is of crucial importance. One possible way to achieve this is through more active operations of the 
National Contact Point. Based on the interviewees’ opinions, it might not lead to immediate results; however, 
the situation could gradually improve if more efforts are put into promoting, for example, some of the 
previous success stories. Secondly, the participation in H2020 could be supported by ESIF – providing funding 
for applications of selective quality that passed the threshold but were not funded. In order to do so, the 
prioritisation of such applications should be included in the project selection criteria. There should also be a 
supportive mechanism in place – prioritisation or a special fund – intended to help organisations find co-
financing for projects that received part of their funding from Horizon 2020.  
Another method for increasing the lagging economies’ participation in Horizon 2020 is through the 
encouragement of the consortiums, which are usually formed in more developed economies, to make new 
partners involved. Currently, the consortiums are evaluated by assessing each of the partners and their 
capabilities; thus, there are opportunity costs associated with working with unknown partners for the first 
time, even if they look promising, simply because it is an unexplored risk. Thus, allowing the possibility of 
adding a limited number of risk-free partners to the consortium – ones that would not be evaluated when 
deciding on the project’s eligibility for funding - could, for instance, attract the attention of new partners and 
organisations from countries like Latvia, and they could end up receiving more invitations to join projects. 
Strategies for Smart Specialisation 
The Smart Specialisation Strategy is relying heavily on countries being able to establish their unique area of 
expertise. However, the interviews with Latvian participants of international funding programmes show that 
most success stories came about when Latvian R&D organisations were getting more specialised in the 
same, or complementary, area as their partners from more advanced economies. Due to foreign partners’ 
comparative advantage in the same field of science, they chose to outsource and allocate their resources to 
the most efficient use instead. Consequently, it can be argued that Latvia focusing on similar research fields 
as the stronger EU economies can also lead to it being invited to join collaborative projects. Moreover, small 
economies like Latvia’s cannot fully cover an entire research area. Looking at specialisation from a broader 
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geographical perspective, for instance the Baltic Region, could allow the entire region to focus on one or a 
few fields while each country could fully utilise the narrower niches within it. Thus, Latvia and other lagging 
economies could be an example demonstrating that the EU-wide Specialisation Strategy should be less strict 
about finding unique areas of expertise – as in some cases, specialising in complementary areas can turn out 
to be the more economically sound approach.  
Another problem relevant in this context is the generalising of the fields of specialisation that policy-makers 
have demonstrated in the past. For example, Latvia has a strong competence in organic synthesis, but it is 
claimed that Latvia specialises in the field of biotechnology and biomedicine. However, neither biotechnology 
nor biomedicine is the field in which Latvia’s industry or scientists have the greatest capabilities, 
competencies or resources. It is rather organic synthesis and pharmacology. Specialisations listed in 
"Eye@RIS3" are not selected based on evidence but rather on the general compromise between what fields of 
science are perceived to be promising and making at least some correlation with business needs. 
Changes in public procurement law regarding ESIF 
Changes in procurement law that could help increase the efficiency of EU fund related policy-making and the 
quality of public tenders’ outcomes in Latvia, including an increase in the threshold and a reduction in the 
procedural requirements. 
Possibility to convert non-commercial research infrastructure to commercial use 
The possibility of converting non-commercial use of research infrastructure to commercial use by simply 
compensating the difference in support intensities should be developed. It may encourage the broader and 
more effective participation of the industry in the decisions regarding R&I infrastructure. Currently, due to the 
penalties 45 of such a conversion, management authority is reluctant to agree to such a possibility. Business 
is not ready to purchase the expensive R&I equipment in the early phases of research; however it can 
gradually increase its participation at later stages. 
 
10. REGIONAL ANALYSIS  
Not applicable. 
 
                                                        
45 In case the MS converts the EU funded research infrastructure to commercial one, it shall return the difference in 
funding between pure research infrastructure and commercial R&D infrastructure. The MS in such case cannot use 
residual funding for other development needs.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
BIRTI   
CC 
Baltic Innovative Research and Technology Infrastructure 
Competence Centre 
CFLA Central Finance and Contracting Agency. Agency under the Ministry of 
Finance 
COSME Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, EU Programme 
DG JRC 
EaSI 
Directorate General Joint Research Centre 
European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation 
EC European Commission 
ESIF European Structural and Investment Funds 
EU 
Eye@RIS3 
European Union 
An online database intended as a tool to help strategy development for 
the Smart Specialisation Strategy 
FPs Framework Programmes for research and technology development; FP7 
is referring to the 7th Framework Programme carried out in the period of 
2007-2013 
FTE Full Time Equivalent 
GDP 
GNI 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross National Income 
H2020 Horizon 2020 
HEI 
ICT 
IF 
 
IP 
Higher Education Institution 
Information and Communications Technology 
Individual Fellowships. Grants under the MSCA for top researchers to 
work outside their own country 
Intellectual Property   
IPTS 
IT 
JRC 
KfG 
KP VIS 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
Information Technology 
Joint Research Centre 
Knowledge for Growth. A scientific unit of JRC-IPTS 
Management Information System of the Cohesion Programme 
(Kohēzijas Politikas Vadības Informācijas Sistēma) 
LIAA 
 
MA 
MC 
MIS 
Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (Latvijas Investīciju un 
Attīstības Aģentūra); The English abbreviation – IDAL 
Managing Authority 
Monitoring Committee 
Management and Information System  
MoE Ministry of Economics 
MoES Ministry of Education and Science 
MS Member States of European Union 
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MSCA Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions 
NCP 
NGO 
PPP 
National Contact Point 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Purchasing Power Parity 
PRO 
RIC 
RIS3 
R&D 
R&I 
R&D&I 
S2E 
Public Research Organisation 
Research and Innovation Council 
Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation 
Research and Development 
Research and Innovation 
Research, Development and Innovation 
Stairway to Excellence 
SF 
SME 
STDI 
SWOT 
TDIG 
Structural Funds  
Small-Medium Enterprise 
Science, Technology Development and Innovation 
Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats 
Guidelines for Science, Technology Development, and Innovation 2014-
2020 
TTO Technology Transfer Office  
VIAA State Education Development Agency (Valsts Izglītības Attīstības 
Aģentūra); The English abbreviation - SEDA 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A. The legal framework for EU fund governance 
General conditions regarding EU funding programmes for the 2014-2020 period are set out in the “European 
Commission–Latvia Partnership Agreement for 2014-2020”.46  
The main principles are regulated by the “Law on Management of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds 2014 – 
2020 Programming Period”.47 The law sets out the main principles for the period of 2014 – 2020, including 
the rights and obligations of institutions and beneficiaries managing EU funds. It also identifies the 
framework and composition principles of the Monitoring Committee, including assigning the Cabinet of 
Ministers as a governing body of the EU funding programmes. Finally, the law describes dispute and appeal 
procedures regarding the decisions of institutions managing EU funds as well as disclosure conditions for 
information related to the projects. The law was adopted by the Parliament of Latvia on March 07, 2014 and 
it came into effect on July 11, 2014. 
National priorities and guidelines for implementation to promote innovation have been set in the Guidelines 
for National Industrial Policy for 2014-202048 (approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on June 28, 2013). 
According to the Guidelines, promotion of innovation is one of the fundamental pillars to enhance 
competitiveness, productivity and physical export volumes. The National Industrial Policy highlights four 
equally important elements to improve the national innovation system: i) knowledge capacity; ii) innovation 
supply; iii) demand for innovation; and iv) a knowledge transfer system. 
Complementarily, the national innovation policy objectives and actions are set out in the Science, Technology 
Development and Innovation Guidelines 2014-2020 (TDIG) (approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 
December 28, 2013).49 TDIG includes the Smart Specialisation Strategy for Latvia, which is based on the 
Guidelines for National Industrial Policy.  
                                                        
  46 "European Commission–Latvia Partnership Agreement for 2014-2020" (Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia, European 
Commission, 2014. gada), http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/pa/partnership-agreement-latvia-summary_en.pdf. 
47 "The Law on Management of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds 2014 – 2020 Programming Period", LIKUMI.LV, skatīts 
2015. gada 10. aprīlī, http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=267471. 
48 Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas Ministrija, "Nacionālās industriālās politikas pamatnostādnes 2014.-2020.gadam" 
(Rīga, 2013. gada 18. jūnijā). 
49 Izglītības un Zinātnes ministrija, "Zinātnes, tehnoloģijas attīstības un inovācijas pamatnostādnes 2014.-2020.gadam", 
2013. gada 28. decembrī, http://polsis.mk.gov.lv/view.do?id=4608. 
39 
 
APPENDIX B. ESIF support for the companies by type: Approved projects in the period 2007-
2013.50 
 
  
                                                        
50 Table compiled by the author. Based on data provided by: Latvian Innovation and Development Agency (LIAA). 
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APPENDIX C. Micro level indicators of the RIS351 
RIS3 MICRO LEVEL INDICATORS 
(R (Result) – Result indicator; I (Impact) – 
Impact indicator; O (Output) – Output 
indicator) 
Programmes that  contribute towards achieving the 
investment indicator 
SF National budget 
R Income from licences/patents of 
scientific institutions (EUR) 
Research and R&D infrastructure 
development programmes, 
Competence centre and 
Technology transfer programme 
(SO 111, SO 112) 
Base funding; 
National research 
programmes 
O 
 
I 
Business co-funding of R&D projects 
(EUR) 
Research and R&D infrastructure 
development programmes 
(SO 111, SO 112) 
Base funding; 
National research 
programmes 
O The number of the companies that have 
received support for introducing new 
products or technologies 
Support programme for 
introducing new 
products/technologies (SO 112) 
Corporate income tax 
allowances 
I Company income from new products or 
technologies introduced (EUR) 
Competence centre programme 
(SO 112) 
- 
I New companies established by scientific 
institutions (spin-offs) 
Technology transfer support 
programme (SO 112) 
Base funding, Higher 
education funding 
O The amount of loans granted to micro 
and small enterprises (EUR) 
Financial instrument support - 
O The number of businesses that have 
received preparation and start-up capital 
support in their early development 
phase, risk capital funding in the 
expansion phase 
Financial instrument support - 
O The number of new scientists supported 
for implementing post-doctorate 
research 
Post-doctorate support 
programme (SO 111) 
- 
O 
 
I 
Newly created jobs, including the jobs 
for scientists in the public 
sector/business sector 
Competence centre programme 
(SO 112), Post-doctoral support 
programme (SO 111), Business 
incubators 
- 
R 
Funding raised for H2020 confirmed 
Support programme for 
international cooperation in 
“Baltic Bonus” initiative 
                                                        
51 Table by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia from “Smart specialization strategy monitoring 
system”  
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I 
project applications (LV part; EUR) research and innovations (SO 
111) 
R Scientific articles published in the 
international data bases (Scopus, Web of 
Science) 
Research programme (SO 111), 
Competence centre programme 
(SO 112) 
Base funding; 
National research 
programmes, Higher 
education funding, 
Support for 
fundamental and 
practical research 
R Employees trained Training support programmes 
(SO 112, SO 822, SO 841) 
- 
O The number of MA students and doctoral 
students involved in R&D projects 
Research programme (SO 111), 
Competence centre programme 
(SO 112) 
National research 
programmes, Higher 
education funding 
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APPENDIX D. Innovation related business support programmes, project data in thousands of 
EUR.52 
Programme name 
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Cluster programme Soft 
4 605 2 675 7 280 1.1% 37% 
Co-financing to the investments in micro- and 
small-sized enterprises operating in the 
specially assisted areas 
Hard 
28 233 46 979 75 212 6.8% 62% 
Competence centres Soft 
53 176 18 301 71 477 12.8% 26% 
Contact points of transfer of technologies Soft 
2 201 530 2 730 0.5% 19% 
Development of new products and 
technologies 
Soft 
9 737 27 097 36 834 2.4% 74% 
Development of new products and 
technologies - aid for industrial property 
rights 
Soft 
303 221 524 0.1% 42% 
Development of new products and 
technologies – aid for implementation of new 
products and technologies in production 
Hard 
61 109 46 002 107 111 14.8% 43% 
High value-added investments  Hard 
254 454 224 318 478 773 61.4% 47% 
New product and technology development in 
SMEs 
Soft 
283 217 500 0.1% 43% 
Total  
414 101 366 340 780 441 
  
 
  
                                                        
52 Table compiled and data provided by LIAA in 2015. 
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APPENDIX E. The limited absorptive capacity 
In the long-term, there are some positive trends indicated for the R&D sector in Latvia. For example, the 
proportion of students selecting natural sciences or engineering is slowly, but consistently, increasing. 
University admission data listed by fields presented by MoES shows that since 2004, the relative popularity 
of natural sciences and engineering studies as a percentage of the total number has increased from 
approximately 20 percent to almost 30 percent (Table 3). 
However, the increase in relative popularity of R&D studies does not solve the issue, as the overall number of 
students in Latvia has been decreasing since 2004 (Figure F1). This trend, together with the ageing 
population of researchers, will make the problem of limited absorptive capacity of EU funds worse. Therefore, 
an immediate focus on, and more attention should be paid to, the human resources available in the R&D 
sector. 
  
 
Figure E1. Number of students in higher education in Latvia. Data source: Ministry of Education 
and Science 
 
In the academic year 2014/2015, the total number of students in higher education institutions was 85,900, 
which is 4% less than a year ago. However, in 2012, when Latvia still had 97,000 students, the students in 
tertiary education comprised 4.85% compared to a 4% average in the EU. Factors that have caused a 
reduction in students are demographical and economic crises, which have reduced the ability of the 
population to pay for higher education and have caused a high number of young people to emigrate to other 
countries. 
Eight technology transfer points were created at universities in Latvia, their annual budget is approximately 
€50,000 per year, which allows them to provide only limited services to their respective university or 
businesses. As verified in the interviews with transfer offices, the average contact point dealt with one or two 
businesses per week, despite the fact that some universities have over 540 academic personnel and 460 
research personnel. 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Studies 131 131 130 127 125 113 104 97 94 90
Graduated 24 26 26 27 24 26 27 25 21 22
Admitted 42 44 45 44 41 31 31 32 33 31
 -
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
o
f 
st
u
d
en
ts
 
Year 
Number of students in higher education  
(in thousands of students) 
44 
Table E1. Relative popularity of different fields of science and technology; student admission 
data.53 
53 Source: Ministry of Education and Science. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1- Natural sciences 4.9% 5.1% 4.9% 4.6% 5.2% 7.2% 6.8% 6.7% 6.8% 6.9% 
2- Engineering and 
technologies 
13.5% 14.9% 14.9% 15.4% 15.6% 19.7% 19.1% 19.3% 19.1% 20.5% 
3- Medicine and life 
sciences 
3.9% 4.4% 5.0% 5.0% 5.4% 7.4% 9.3% 9.7% 11.3% 12.7% 
4- Agriculture 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 
5- Social sciences 68.7% 65.1% 65.0% 64.9% 63.3% 53.4% 52.9% 52.4% 51.2% 48.3% 
6- Humanities 6.6% 7.3% 7.5% 7.6% 8.0% 9.3% 8.9% 8.4% 8.0% 8.0% 
8- Other, security, 
government 
1.3% 2.1% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% 1.7% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 
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